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COMMENTS
PROVIDING BLANKET COMMENT K
IMMUNITY TO ALL FDA APPROVED ETHICAL
DRUGS: THE DEFECT IN GRUNDBERG v.
UPJOHN CO.
For many years, courts have addressed various liability issues
concerning personal injury, arising from the use of products made
for internal consumption.' In an attempt to refine the law in this
area, the American Law Institute ("ALI")2 proposed section
' See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1944) (plaintiff
injured when defective soda bottle exploded); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 405
(1852) ("alarming effects" caused by ingestion of belladonna); Castrignano v. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 777 (R.I. 1988) (physical abnormalities caused by exposure to
DES in utero). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT] (historical underpinnings to strict liability especially concerning foods);
Frank M. McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the Maze
of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 1 (1978) (drug
induced injury claims have been problematic); Teresa M. Schwartz, Products Liability Law
and Pharmaceuticals: New Developments and Divergent Trends, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 33,
33 (1988) (recent and past trends in the law in pharmaceutical cases); Patty C. Selker, Com-
ment, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Responsibility for Drug Re-
lated Injuries Under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 23 DuQ. L.
REV. 199, 203 (1984) (different approaches to strict liability problem in pharmaceutical
cases).
' See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at vii-viii. The American Law Institute consists of a
distinguished group of legal scholars from the academic, judicial and practicing areas. Id.;
see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990). The American Law Institute's pur-
pose in writing the Restatement of Torts as well as other Restatements, was to "tell what
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402AI and comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.4 In
jurisdictions that have adopted this section,5 plaintiffs suing manu-
facturers for injuries resulting from defective6 products are
the law in a general area is, how it is changing, and what direction the authors .. . think
this change should take." Id. See generally Kathleen H. Wilson, Note, The Liability of Phar-
maceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735,
735-39 (1980) (events leading to ALI's adoption of strict liability).
3 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at vii. Section 402A was adopted as an amendment to
the Restatement in 1964. Id. According to its authors, section 402A "states a special rule
applicable to sellers of products. The rule is one of strict liability, making the seller subject
to liability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of the product." Id. § 402A, at cmt. a; see also MARSHALL S. Shapo, 1
THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 7.06 (2d ed. 1990) (increasing majority of states have
adopted strict liability). But see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01(Cal. 1962) (Supreme Court of California adopted concept of strict liability before it was
codified in Restatement § 402A).
4 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A. The comments following section 402A were
provided by the authors to aid in the interpretation and application of the sections, Id.
Comments a, b and c describe the function and history of, and justification for the ALI's
amending the Restatement to include § 402A. Id. Comments d and e discuss the parame-
ters and application of strict liability while comments f through n define relevant terms and
provide exceptions to the section. Id.; see also Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and
the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 360 (1991)
(effects of comments in implementing § 402A); Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The
Case Against Comment k and for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 860-64 (1983) (effect of
§ 402A in light of accompanying comments); Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under
Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 406-08
(1990) (same).
6 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A. Section 402A states in full:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or customer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. Although the Restatement is not the law per se, jurisdictions widely hold that section
402A is representative of their law. See M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6.1, at
192 n.12 (2d ed. 1988) (as of 1988, thirty-three jurisdictions have adopted Restatement
position on strict liability in tort). But see Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah
1991) (courts need not adhere to Restatement's principles since it is not law per se).
6 See Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 302 (Idaho 1987) (defining defective prod-
uct), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988); Sidney H. Willig, The Comment K Character: A Concep-
tual Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545, 550-51 (1978) (importance of Com-
ment g). Comment g of section 402A states that a product which leaves the hands of the
manufacturer in a condition not contemplated by the consumer can be called defective for
purposes of the section. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A at cmt. g. However, certain
products are unavoidably unsafe and cannot be defined as defective. See infra note 11
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equipped with an alternative theory of recovery. 7 This alternative
theory, strict products liability, relieves plaintiffs of the more sub-
stantial burden of proving negligence.' Although most jurisdic-
tions have adopted section 402AI there have been differing inter-
(Comment k defines when product is unavoidably unsafe).
7 See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1065 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff recovered
from manufacturer of IUD in strict liability action where item perforated plaintiff's
uterus); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 376-77 (N.J. 1984) (plaintiff successfully
asserted strict liability cause of action where drug containing tetracycline discolored her
teeth), rev'd on other grounds, 592 A.2d 1176 (1991); see also George H. King, Note, A
Prescription for Applying Strict Liability: Not All Drugs Deserve Comment K Immunization, Brown
v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal.Rptr. (1988), 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809,
811 (1989) (strict liability is widely-accepted claim against manufacturers).
Strict liability claims consist of three theories: failure to warn, manufacturing defect, and
design defect. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, at cmt. c. Comment c provides
in relevant part:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who
may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that repu-
table sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the bur-
den of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is enti-
tled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons
to afford it are those who market the products.
Id.: Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1981) (design de-
fect and failure to warn); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 120
(Colo. 1983) (blood was defectively manufactured product); see John W. Wade, On the Na-
ture of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (seven factors of
risk-benefit test). See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (discussion of three theories of
strict liability); Selker, supra note 1, at 204-15 (discussion of application of strict liability's
three theories in drug field).
' See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 45 (Wis.) (aside from actual damages and
causation, negligence claim must establish manufacturer owed duty of care and breached
that duty in manufacturing product in question), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). See gen-
erally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 700 (burdens of proof in negligence claim). In a
strict liability claim, once the plaintiff proves that the product in question was defective,
knowledge of such defect is imputed to the manufacturer as long as the plaintiff used the
product in a manner that was foreseeable. Id. The plaintiff is not required to show that the
manufacturer's actions were unreasonable, Id.; see Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d
915, 923 (Kan. 1990) ("Under the strict liability theory a plaintiff is not required to estab-
lish misconduct by the maker or seller but, instead, is required to impugn the product.").
But see Feldman, 479 A.2d at 385-86 (under certain standards strict liability claims and
negligence claims require same proof (citing WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 659 n.72
(4th ed. 1971))).
' See, e.g., Brochu, 642 F.2d at 654 (New Hampshire adopted § 402A in Buttrick v. Ar-
thur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111, 113 (N.H. 1969)); Belle Bonfils, 665 P.2d at 122
(Colorado adopted § 402A in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 988 (Colo.
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pretations by the courts." In particular, the application of section
402A, comment k ("Comment k"), 11 which prohibits strict prod-
ucts liability suits against manufacturers of "unavoidably unsafe
products," has resulted in a divergence of opinions 2 in cases in-
1975)): Toner, 732 P.2d at 304 (Idaho adopted § 402A in Shields v. Morton Chemical Co.,
518 P.2d 857, 859-60 (Idaho 1974)); Savina, 795 P.2d at 923 (Kansas adopted § 402A in
Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104, 1107-08 (Kan. 1976)). There has been a greater diver-
gence of opinion among courts when asked to decide whether Comments a through q
should also be adopted as part of their law. See, e.g., Brochu, 642 F.2d at 656 n.5 (New
Hampshire's reliance on Comment k); Belle Bonfils, 665 P.2d at 121 (Comment k excep-
tion); Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 540 P.2d 835, 840 (contributory
negligence of plaintiff no defense to strict liability claim in accordance with Comment n),
cert. denied, 540 P.2d 249 (N.M. 1975); see also King, supra note 7, at 809-10 (noting differ-
ent applications of Comment k). But see Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 52 ("rule embodied in com-
ment k is too restrictive and, therefore, not commensurate with strict liability law in
Wisconsin").
1 See Belle Bonfils, 665 P.2d at 122-23 (seller has burden of establishing application of
comment k): Toner, 732 P.2d at 308 ("comment k is an affirmative defense to a claim based
on strict liability"). But see Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988)
(Comment k blanket immunity for manufacturer). See generally Richard C. Ausness, Un-
avoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should be Applied to
the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 Ky. L.J. 705, 706-34 (1989-1990) (extent of Com-
ment k immunity).
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, at cmt. k. Comment k of § 402A provides:
Unavoidably Unsafe Products. There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the dis-
ease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same
is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very
reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a
physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstand-
ing a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualifi-
cation that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
12 See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 380 (N.J. 1984) ("We do not agree [with
defendant] that the protective shield of comment k immunizes all prescription drugs"),
rev'd on other grounds, 592 A.2d 1176 (1991); 38 A.L.l, PROC. 19, 92-98 (1961) [hereinafter
Proceedings] (Comment k was intended to be possible exception to § 402A); supra note 11
(text of Comment k). Compare Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir.
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volving ethical drugs.13 Recently, in Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,' 4 the
Utah Supreme Court 8 expanded the literal interpretation of
Comment k"6 and held that in a strict products liability claim
based on the theory of design defect, 17 a drug approved by the
United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") 8 is "un-
1969) (drug not unreasonably dangerous as within section 402A if adequate warning pro-
vided) and Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1968) (strict liability
avoided by proper directions and warning) with Bichler v. Eli Lilly Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571,
586, 436 N.E.2d 182, 189, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 783 (1982) (plaintiff recovery not precluded
by Comment k). But cf Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 n. II (blanket immunity under wording of
Comment k); John P. Reilly, The Erosion of Comment K, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 255, 255-56
(1989) (Comment k exempts unavoidably unsafe products from strict liability). See generally
King, supra note 7, at 809 (different interpretations of Comment k).
"S See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 427 (1983). Webster's defines
"ethical" (drug) as those "restricted to sale only on a doctor's prescription." Id.; see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 687 ("over-the-counter drugs and cosmetics are prod-
ucts that do not ordinarily involve risk of serious injury or death"); Selker, supra note i, at
199 (defining "ethical"). See generally Proceedings, supra note 12, at 92-95. Ethical drugs, as
opposed to over-the-counter and prescription drugs, can only be obtained by prescription..
Id. Prescription drugs can include over-the-counter and ethical drugs. Id. Ethical drugs due
to their strength and nature are considered dangerous enough to require a prescription by
a physician. Id.
This Comment discusses providing a blanket immunity to drugs approved by the FDA
which due to their nature and value to society have been given protection from strict liabil-
ity despite injuries associated with their use. Cases cited and discussed are those concerning
drugs which can only be obtained through prescription.
4 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
"6 Id. at 89-90. Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
United States District Court for the District of Utah certified questions relating to this
action to the Supreme Court of Utah. Id.
"6 Id.: see West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Ark. 1991) ("We adopt this second
view [as an affirmative defense] because of the wording of the comment itself and because
it is the better public policy."); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576 So.2d 728, 732 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Comment k from its wording denotes only possible exceptions to §
402A): "infra note 51 (drafters did not intend to provide blanket immunity).
Comment k states that there are certain products which when properly prepared and
accompanied by proper directions and warnings are not defective. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 402A, at cmt. k. However, this wording has been used to justify a blanket immu-
nity for prescription drugs. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 n. 1l (Cal.
1988).
1" See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981). A claim
for design defect arises in a situation where a product is manufactured according to design
"but the design itself poses unreasonable dangers to consumers" (quoting Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978)). Id. The Court in Grundberg states
that the three types of defects a product can have are (1) manufacturing flaws, (2) design
defects, and (3) inadequate warnings regarding use. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92.
- 21 U.S.C. § 321 (Supp. 1991). In 1940 the FDA was created and placed under the
authority of the Department of Agriculture, and was transferred in 1980 to its current
agency. Id.: see id. § 301 (statutory definition of FDA); see also infra notes 83-93 and accom-
panying text (discussing FDA).
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avoidably unsafe" and cannot, as a matter of law, be defective.1 9
In Grundberg, plaintiff Ilo Grundberg suffered from chronic de-
pression and anxiety2 ° for which her doctor prescribed Halcion,2"
a drug manufactured by defendant Upjohn Company ("Upjohn")
for use in treating insomnia.22 On June 19, 1988, after approxi-
mately one year of use, Mrs. Grundberg shot and killed her
mother.23 As a defense to criminal charges which were brought
against her, she claimed that side effects24 from Halcion caused
her to commit the homicidal act.25 Subsequently, all criminal
19 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90; see supra note 5 (text of § 402A).
20 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 104 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 104 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "Halcion is the trade name for triazolam, a
prescription medication used for treatment of insomnia. Triazolam is one of a class of
drugs known as benzodiazepines. Halcion, which is manufactured by Upjohn, was approved
by the FDA in November 1982." Id.; see PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2164-65 (43d ed.
1989). Halcion is an hypnotic agent in the benzodiazepine class that is meant to be used for
short term management of insomnia. Id. The adverse reactions listed include confusional
states and depression. Id. Paradoxical reactions include aggressiveness, inappropriate be-
havior and "other adverse behavioral effects." Id.; see also TRIAL, Guide to Litigation Groups
- Halcion, at S-13 (July 1991) [hereinafter TRIAL].
Halcion, an extremely popular drug prescribed to treat insomnia, has been re-
ported to have adverse behavioral side effects. Dramatic withdrawal effects such as
further insomnia and anxiety have been clinically observed not only after discontin-
ued use but in the intervals between nightly use. Long-term use may produce or-
ganic changes in the brain. Because of the drug's potency, overdosing is a potential
problem.
Halcion has been associated with severely adverse central nervous system reac-
tions, including psychosis, hallucinations, paranoia, depression, aggression, panic
anxiety, and detachment from reality. Amnesia is another frequent side effect ....
Following widespread national publicity in 1988 about the behavioral side effects
of Halcion, several lawsuits were filed against Upjohn.
Id.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA"), has formed several advocacy
groups, including the Halcion Litigation Group, which provides information and encour-
ages attorney membership through ATLA's publication, Trial. Id. A primary goal of the
Halcion Litigation Group is to develop a repository of Halcion-related documents and it
recently defeated an attempt by Upjohn to prevent attorneys from sharing these docu-
ments. Telephone Interview with Earle F. Lasseter, co-chair of the Halcion Litigation
Group and co-counsel to Mrs. Ilo Grundberg, plaintiff in the instant action (July 11, 1991).
2" Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90.
3 Id. at 104 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
24 See id. at 90 (discussing side-effect defense); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718
P.2d 1318, 1321 (Kan. 1986) (discussing side-effects), affd, 758 P.2d 206 (1988). "Side-
Effects" are adverse reactions to a particular drug, producing a secondary and unusual
unfavorable result. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 641 (2d ed. 1974); see also Wilson, supra
note 2, at 735-38 (examination of adverse drug reactions).
"5 See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90 (plaintiff in state of Halcion-induced intoxication when
she shot mother). On the day of the shooting, Mrs. Grundberg was taking a variety of
medications for depression and anxiety, including Halcion, Valium and Codeine. Id. at 104
480
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.
charges were dropped.26
Mrs. Grundberg and her mother's estate brought suit in the
United States District Court for, the District of Utah against
Upjohn in strict products liability, claiming, inter alia,2 7 that Hal-
cion was defectively designed.28 Upjohn moved for summary judg-
ment on the strict liability claim contending that Halcion was an
unavoidably unsafe product which came within the purview of
Comment k.29 The district court, faced with the unanswered ques-
tion of whether Utah adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products"
exception"0 to strict products liability as set forth in Comment k,
certified this and related questions31 to the Supreme Court of
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Valium (which is Roche's name for diazepam) is a benzodiazepine
derivative used for anxiety disorders. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 21, at 1772.
Adverse reactions include rage and depression. Id. Codeine accompanies a variety of differ-
ent medications containing different chemical agents. Id. at 308.
"' See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 104 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (upon recommendation of
medical expert who testified as to Mrs. Grundberg's state of mind at time of shooting, all
criminal charges were dropped).
" Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90. Plaintiff also brought suit in strict products liability for
failure-to-warn and in common law negligence. Id. Those causes of action were unaffected
by the decision in Grundberg. Id.
" See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 699 ("Under a danger-utility test, product is
defective as designed if, but only if, the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of
the product"). See generally Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach to the Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 20-33 (1982) (current defenses to
design defect claims); Willig, supra note 6, at 572-78 (miscellaneous Comment k defense
considerations in drug and cosmetic areas).
29 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90. There is no evidence in the Grundberg decision of
Upjohn's raising the defense of federal preemption by FDA approval of Halcion over
plaintiff's state-based tort claim. Id. For a discussion of this defense, see Feldman v. Lederle
Lab., 592 A.2d 1176, 1183 (N.J. 1991). In Feldman, defendant raised federal preemption
of state tort action as a defense to the plaintiff's strict liability claim for inadequate warn-
ings. The court held that there was no preemption. Id. Similarly, in Abbott v. American
Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1114 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988), the court
addressed federal preemption by FDA regulations over a design defect claim, and subse-
quently held that defendant's contention of federal preemption was without merit. Id.
30 See also Joseph H. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K andfor Strict
Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 855 (1983) ("under the [Comment k] analysis, if the
benefits of a product outweigh its known risks, and if the manufacturer has provided suita-
ble warnings and directions for use, the defendant's product will be deemed reasonably
safe and the plaintiff will not recover"); supra note 11 (text of Comment k).
3' See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90-91. The district court certified the following questions:
I. Does Utah adopt the "unavoidably unsafe products" exception to strict liability as
set forth in comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965)?
(a) If Utah does adopt comment k, should FDA-approved prescription drugs be
deemed as a matter of law to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to
the comment k exception, or should that determination be made on a case-by-case
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Utah before ruling on the motion.32
Justice Durham, writing for the majority in a 3-2 decision,
stated that Comment k applies only to causes of action in strict
products liability based on design defects. 3 Furthermore, the
court agreed with the basic-principles set forth in Comment k,
specifically that there are certain products which are unavoidably
unsafe. 4 The court discussed the manner in which other jurisdic-
tions have applied Comment k immunity, comparing jurisdictions
that have adopted a case-by-case, risk-benefit analysis3" with those
basis?
(b) If Utah does adopt comment k, and if it is further determined that its application
to FDA-approved prescription drugs ought to be made on a case-by-case basis, is
such determination a threshold question for the trial court or a question properly to
be presented to the jury?
(c) If it is determined that comment k is to be applied to FDA-approved prescription
drugs on a case-by-case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from the
drug which are not alleged to have been personally suffered by the plaintiff relevant
to the "unavoidably unsafe" determination?
Id.
Id. Subsequent to the Grundberg court's disposition on the certified questions, the par-
ties settled. See Geoffrey Cowley et al., Sweet Dreams or Nightmare?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9,
1991, at 44 [hereinafter Sweet Dreams].
" Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92; see West v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613
(Ark. 1991) ("by its terms, Comment k exempts unavoidably unsafe products from strict
liability only where the plaintiff alleges a design defect") (emphasis added); Toner v. Led-
erie Lab., 732 P.2d'297, 305 (Idaho 1987) (Comment k applies to strict liability actions
claiming design defects), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
" Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92; see, e.g., West, 806 S.W.2d at 612 (products with no feasible
alternative design to accomplish product's purpose are unavoidably unsafe); Dunn v. Led-
erie Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576, 584 n.21 (Mich. App. 1982) (oral polio vaccine unavoidably
unsafe). But see Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275 (5th Cir.) (drug is unreasonably
dangerous due to inadequate warnings), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
' See Wade, supra note 7, at 837. The classic seven factors of the risk-utility analysis
proposed by Professor Wade are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of
the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by set-
ting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
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that have held all prescription drugs are entitled to immunity as a
matter of law."6 While admitting that the language of Comment k
"contemplates a weighing of the drug's risks and benefits,' 37 the
majority concluded that the elaborate regulatory system overseen
by the FDA was the proper forum in which to review the efficacy
of a prescription drug.3 8 The court reasoned that the FDA tests
provided a legally sufficient screening process to weigh the risks
and benefits of a particular drug, 9 and that the courthouse was
ill-suited for the complexities of design defect claims in prescrip-
tion drug cases."' Furthermore, the court maintained that such
Id.: see also Toner, 732 P.2d at 308 (adopting risk-benefit analysis for Comment k applica-
tion as a "sensible system [servingl . . . important policy considerations, particularly in the
area of ethical drug manufacture"); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 43 ("[diespite [the] uncer-
tainties, the [risk-utility] standard itself is easily understood and fits within traditional prin-
ciples of negligence which are familiar to the legal profession").
"' See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478-80 (Cal. 1988) (all prescription drugs
deserve Comment k immunity). But see Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir.
1989) (adopting case-by-case approach); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924-
26 (Kan. 1990) (Comment k does not apply to all drugs). See generally King, supra note 7, at
818-24 (questioning wisdom of Brown decision and discussing jurisdictions that refuse to
apply Comment k to all prescription drugs).
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95 (citing Toner, 732 P.2d at 306).
I ld. at 96. -[T]he FDA employs a comprehensive scheme of pre-market screening and
post-market surveillance to ensure the safety and efficacy of all licensed medications." Id.
(citing 50 Fed. Reg. 7452 (1985)). The FDA regulates the testing and marketing practices
of drug companies through its new drug application regulations. Id.
The Grundberg court based its holding on the assumption that the drug manufacturer
fully complied with FDA regulations in obtainin'g approval for the drug. Id. at 90. There is
evidence, however, that Upjohn omitted the results from one clinical study which revealed
adverse effects in fifty-eight patients taking Halcion. Mark Hansen, Does Halcion Spur Ag-
gression?, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1991, at 25. If this omission is not sufficient to qualify as non-
compliance with FDA regulations, it is submitted that the Grundberg decision implicitly
endorses insignificant omissions from the reporting requirements of the FDA. It is further
submitted that lower courts, faced with analogous factual situations, would be forced to
determine what constitutes a significant omission thereby undermining the Grundberg
court's primary motivation-uniform lower court rulings.
" See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 97; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 688. ("the drug
approval process involves a complex and often ad hoc balancing of imponderable and com-
mensurate factors relating to danger and utility of marketing a specific new drug"). But see
Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 592 A.2d
1176 (1991).
There has been no showing of the extent to which and how the FDA applies a risk-
utility analysis in deciding whether a drug should be distributed or the effect of the
FDA's determination on drug manufacturers' options to distribute or not distribute
the drug with or without warnings. Indeed, the FDA's determination, even if it con-
sisted of a risk-utility analysis it would not supplant the risk-utility balancing required
in the judicial process.
I d.
4O Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 98-99. See generally James H. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
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deference to the FDA's judgment facilitated the development, af-
fordability and expedient distribution of drugs,"' and provided
guidance for future lower court rulings in this area.42
In dissent, Justice Howe suggested a more discriminating appli-
cation of Comment k.' 3 Under this approach, the Comment k im-
munity defense would be available only when use of a "life-saving
drug" forms the basis of the lawsuit. 4 In addition, Justice Howe
argued that FDA approval in such an action should afford a de-
fendant manufacturer only a rebuttable presumption that its prod-
uct was safely designed.'3
In a separate dissent, Justice Stewart criticized the majority for
its "abdication of judicial responsibility"' 6 through its unjustified
deference to the FDA."7 He cited the inadequacy of the FDA ap-
proval process in preventing harmful drugs from reaching the
market in past years and the subsequent injuries which arose from
their introduction."8 He asserted that the better approach is one
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531,
1531-32 (1973) (court system ill-suited to adequately adjudicate reasonableness of defend-
ant manufacturers' conscious design choices).
See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 99. See generally Richard J. Nelson, Note, Regulation of
Investigational New Drugs: "Giant Step for the Sick and Dying?", 77 GEo. L.J. 463, 472 (1988)
(recent "fast track" regulations promulgated by FDA expediting approval process for
drugs designed to combat life-threatening or seriously debilitating illnesses).
42 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 98.
" Id. at 99 (Howe, J., dissenting).
Id. (Howe, J., dissenting).
Id. (Howe, J., dissenting).
Id. at 100 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576 So. 2d 728, 732
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) ("Applying comment k uniformly to all prescription drugs ...
rejects the comment's own approach to determining its scope."); cf Belle Bonfils Memorial
Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 123 (Colo. 1983) (manufacturer must prove Com-
ment k applicability). Determining the meaning behind Comment k has been the justifica-
tion used by some courts in rationalizing their decisions in pharmaceutical cases involving
claims of design defects. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 n. I1 (Cal. 1988)
(construing language of Comment k to provide blanket immunity); Willig, supra note 6, at
549. The problem posed in design defect cases in recent years has been the extent to which
Comment k applies and the conflicting public policy considerations. Id.; see also Feldman v.
Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) (case-by-case approach should be used be-
cause drugs have flaws like any other product), rev'd on other grounds, 592 A.2d 1176
(1991): Tim Moore, Comment, Comment K Immunity to Strict Liability: Should All Prescription
Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REV. 707, 729 (1989) (discussing economic and social fac-
tors entering into court considerations of Comment k claims).
4" See, e.g., Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp 573, 574 (W.D. La.) (plaintiff got
serious skin condition after ingesting Tegretol), aff d, 864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1988); West v.
G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 806 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Ark. 1991) (birth control pill caused benign
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that utilizes the risk-benefit analysis embodied in Comment k, 49
which weighs a drug's apparent benefits against its apparent risks
at the time of the drug's introduction.5" Under this test, a drug
providing more benefits than risks would receive Comment k im-
munity,5" while a drug not qualifying for immunity would be
"subject to the traditional design-defect analysis set forth in [sec-
tion] 402A."5' 2 Justice Stewart endorsed this approach rather than
the majority's decision which, he asserted, would deprive injured
consumers of a means of obtaining compensation."s
This Comment will address the inappropriateness of substitut-
ing a products liability analysis, traditionally and properly posited
in the judicial system, with the product-marketability standards of
the FDA. Part One will analyze the ALI's purpose in promulgat-
ing Comment k, as well as other jurisdictions' approaches constru-
ing its language. Part Two will briefly review the FDA's approval
process for prescription drugs. Part Three will compare and con-
trast the purposes of the ALI and the FDA in employing their
respective risk-benefit analyses. Finally, Part Four will discuss the
ramifications of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Grundberg.
liver tumor which ruptured); Brown, 751 P.2d at 473 (plaintiff injured in utero by DES):
Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 299 (Idaho 1987) (plaintiff paralyzed after vacci-
nated with defendant's DPT vaccine); Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318,
1320 (Kan. 1986) (plaintiff paralyzed from oral polio vaccine after contracting disease from
recently immunized daughter), aff'd, 758 P.2d 206 (1988); Castrignano v. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 777 (R.I. 1988) (plaintiff sustained in utero injury to reproductive
organs due to mothers ingestion of DES during pregnancy); see also Graham v. Wyeth Lab.,
906 F.2d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir.) (plaintiff suffered brain damage due to DTP vaccine), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 511 (1990); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 432 (D.
Minn. 1988) (plaintiff injured by IUD); Patten v. Lederle Lab., 676 F. Supp. 233, 233 (D.
Utah 1987) (child died as result of DTP vaccine). See generally Nelson, supra note 41, at
469 (injuries resulting despite FDA approval of thalidomide): Willig, supra note 6, at 545
(discussing recall of DES, Dalkon Shield and MER-29).
" Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 103 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra notes 11 and 35 (text of
Comment k and risk-benefit test).
" Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 103 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" Id.; see West, 806 S.W.2d at 612. "[lI]t is obvious that the drafters did not intend to
grant all manufacturers of prescriptive drugs a blanket exception to strict liability." Id.; see
Toner, 732 P.2d at 306. "[The] scales must clearly tip in favor of the benefits for comment
k to apply." Id. "[The] comment refers to "some" products which are unavoidably unsafe;
obviously it does not apply to all drugs." Id. at 308; see also Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 782
(adopted modification of risk-benefit test).
82 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 103 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Selker, supra note 1, at 215. "[T~he purpose of strict
liability is to assure that the entity which transfers the risk to the consumer will ultimately
pay for the injuries caused by the products." Id.
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I. DETERMINING THE MEANING BEHIND COMMENT K
As written by the ALI, Comment k provides an exception to
strict liability claims for design defects against manufacturers of
"unavoidably unsafe" products.5" The ALl recognized that there
are some cases in which, given the limits of technology or the ur-
gent need for a specific product, manufacturers may find it neces-
sary to distribute products that are "incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use.."55 According to the intended
meaning of Comment k," for a product to gain "unavoidably un-
safe" status, a defendant manufacturer must prove that the prod-
uct's utility outweighed its risks,57 that a safer product was un-
available,58 and that the product was unadulterated and effective
for its prescribed use.59 Despite the clarity of both the language
and the intent of Comment k, courts have disagreed as to its
application.6"
A. The Case-by-Case Approach
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Grundberg advocated a lit-
5 See supra note 11 (text of Comment k).
5 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, at cmt. k.
" See Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The drafters of com-
ment k did not intend to grant all manufacturers of prescription drugs a blanket exception
to strict liability. Such an exception was proposed at the American Law Institute meeting
where section 402A and comment k were adopted, but this proposal was defeated.") (citing
38 ALl Proc. 19, 90-98 (1961)).
57 See, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122 (Colo.
1983) (same): Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 306 (Idaho 1987) (product's utility
must outweigh its danger).
"' See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (lst Cir. 1980)
(unreasonably dangerous if substitute exists); Toner, 732 P.2d at 306 (same).
Strict products liability can involve claims alleging failure-to warn and design defects. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A. One of the most important elements of the strict
liability claim is the burden on the plaintiff to prove there is a feasible alternative design.
Certain important drugs or vaccines have been held to have no feasible alternative design.
See, e.g., Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573, 576 (W.D. La.) (marketing polio
vaccine justified despite danger), aff'd, 864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1988); Toner, 732 P.2d at
306 (rabies vaccine deserves Comment k immunity).
This does not seem to be the case with Halcion. The Physicians' Desk Reference lists 20
other benzodiazepines and 11 other hypnotics. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 21,
at 220-24: see also supra note 21 (description of Halcion).
", See supra note 11 (text of Comment k).
"O See supra note 16 (only certain products are excepted by Comment k).
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eral adherence to Comment k6 1 which would inevitably involve
some form of risk-benefit analysis,62 with the burden placed on
the defendant-manufacturer to affirmatively prove the Comment's
applicability. 3 For example, in Castrignano v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., "
the plaintiff sustained personal injuries due to her mother's inges-
tion of DES and brought a strict liability design defect claim
against manufacturer Squibb & Sons, Inc. 65 The court held that
the proper application of Comment k required the trial judge to
conduct an initial risk-utility analysis. 6 If the trial judge con-
cluded that, at the time of its manufacture, the benefits of the
drug clearly outweighed its attendant risks to the extent that rea-
sonable minds could not differ, then Comment k immunity should
be granted as a matter of law. 1 Alternatively, if the judge decided
that reasonable minds could differ, the issue would be resolved by
the finder of fact.68
Many jurisdictions have similarly interpreted Comment k and
despite some variation in application, the underlying risk-benefit
analysis has been preserved. 9 Notwithstanding the wide accept-
ance of the case-by-case approach, the majority in Grundberg con-
cluded that this approach was "unworkable," ' would lead to a
61 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 100 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" See supra note 16 (risk-benefit analysis built into Comment k).
6 See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122-23 (Colo. 1983)
(seller has burden of establishing application of Comment k); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732
P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987) ("comment k is an affirmative defense to a claim based on
strict liability"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
64 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988).
6 Id. at 777.
66 Id. at 778. The decision in Castrignano was in response to questions certified to the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island following the jury's finding defendant Squibb liable for
the damages suffered by the plaintiff. Id. The court responded that "[t]he application of
Comment k is a mixed question of law and fact. The defendant who uses comment k as a
defense bears the burden of proving that the comment applies. If reasonable minds could
only reach one conclusion, the judge may rule on comment k's application. Otherwise, the
question should be submitted to the jury." Id.; see supra note 35 (risk-utility test).
67 Id. at 782.
66 Id.
6 See e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1989) (Comment k is affirm-
ative defense); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981)
(applying risk-benefit test); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 309 (Idaho 1987)
("courts must decide the applicability of Comment k case by case"), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
942 (1988): Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 925 (Kan. 1990) (same).
70 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 1991).
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disparity of lower court rulings,71 and could deter drug manufac-
turers from producing new and valuable medicines.7' Neverthe-
less, it is submitted that the case-by-case approach better preserves
both plaintiffs .remedy for an avoidably unsafe drug and manufac-
turer's defense for a highly beneficial, though dangerous, drug.
B. The Blanket Immunity Approach
The Grundberg court provided blanket Comment k immunity to
all ethical drugs approved by the FDA."3 The decision was pre-
mised on Brown v. Superior Court,74 where the plaintiff was injured
in utero by her mother's ingestion of DES.7 5 In Brown, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected the case-by-case approach76 which
it had previously developed in Kearl v. Lederle.77 The Brown court,
finding the approach "unworkable" 78 because it gave the trial
judge "mixed questions of law and fact,"7 9 held that Comment k
71 Id. at 98.
72 Id. at 99.
71 Id.: see Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1988) (Comment k pro-
vides immunity for all prescription drugs); accord Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576
So.2d 728, 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In Adams, the court stated:
[C]ourts which apply comment k to all prescription drugs frequently state that the
public's interest in the development of prescription drug products requires the user
to bear all costs of injury unless the drug product was negligently manufactured,
negligently designed, or accompanied by inadequate product warnings; otherwise,
drug manufacturers might be discouraged from developing new products.
Id. But see Toner, 732 P.2d at 309 (Comment k applies to strict liability claims on case-by-
case basis).
" 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
" Id. at 473. Plaintiff was one of "at least 69" patients who filed personal injury actions
in the San Francisco Superior Court due to their mothers' ingestion of DES during preg-
nancy. Id.
76 Id. at 482; see Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 464 (1985), overruled by
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). According to the Kearl test, the judge
was to determine:
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer an exceptionally
important benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the then-
existing risk posed by the product was both 'substantial' and 'unavoidable'; and (3)
whether the interest in availability (again measured as of the time of distribution)
outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability through strict liability
design defect review.
Id. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, "the liability of the manufacturer is
tested by the standards of Comment k; otherwise, strict liability is the applicable test."
Brown, 751 P.2d at 481.
" 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
78 Brown, 751 P.2d at 481.
71 Id. at 482. "In order to vindicate the public's interest in the availability and af-
488
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.
was intended and should apply to all prescription drugs."0
The Grundberg court disregarded the factual arguments assert-
ing Halcion's propensity for causing substantial adverse side ef-
fects,81 concluding that the judicial system need not inquire fur-
ther into a particular drug's design because the FDA's approval
process is extensive enough to ensure that only safe drugs reach
the marketplace.82 It is submitted that this blanket immunity ap-
proach deprives plaintiffs of a vital cause of action while indiscrim-
inately allowing defendants to avoid liability once their products
receive FDA approval.
II. THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
Pursuant to congressional legislation, the FDA instituted a com-
prehensive regulatory system to assure manufacturers' compliance
with the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.8 3 The purpose of
this regulatory system is to protect the public health and welfare
from misbranded and adulterated articles of medicine and food. 8'
In furtherance of this objective, the FDA maintains its own
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research85 which must approve
fordability of prescription drugs, a manufacturer must have a greater assurance that his
products will not be measured by a strict liability than is provided by the test stated in
Kearl." Id. But see Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576 So.2d 728, 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (denying cause of action for design defects will not stop poor marketing prac-
tices); Selker, supra note 1, at 216. "Those early examples of medical pioneering were
developed with a view toward urgent public health needs by independent scientists with no
apparent motive for pecuniary gain, whereas today most pharmaceuticals are developed in
large drug houses on the basis of potential market value." Id. See generally Wilson, supra
note 2, at 757-58 (deterrent effect on drug manufacturers).
80 Brown, 751 P.2d at 482 n.1l.
sI See Sweet Dreams, supra note 32, at 46 (highlighting Halcion-related injuries); see also
Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.S. Not Planning to Ban Sleeping Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at A 18
(discussing British ban of Halcion).
82 Grundberg v, Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 97 (Utah 1991).
" Id. at 96. "The federal government has established an elaborate regulatory system,
overseen by the FDA, to control the approval and distribution of these drugs. No other
class of products is subject to such special restrictions or protections in our society." ld.; see
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988) (text of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
8" See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913, 917 (7th Cir.) (liberal interpretation
given to statutes which promote public health), affd, 335 U.S. 345 (1947); Barnes v.
United States, 142 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1944) (purpose of Act is protection of consum-
ing public): cf Upjohn Mfg. Co. v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 480, 484 (6th Cir. 1982) (regula-
tions governing FDA approval not intended to provide manufacturers with patent-like
protection).
s 21 C.F.R. § 5.100 (1990). The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research is located in
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all drugs before they may be sold in the United States.86 To com-
ply with the FDA's approval process, manufacturers must submit a
New Drug Application8" asserting the proposed drug's safety and
effectiveness for its purported use.88 Approval is given to new
drugs if substantial evidence89 shows that the proposed drug is as
effective as the proposed labeling represents and is safe according
to New Drug Application tests and expert medical opinion.90 In
addition, an abbreviated approval process is available when a new
drug's active ingredient is identical to that of a drug which is al-
ready FDA approved. 91 After receiving approval, the manufac-
turer is further obligated to periodically submit reports pertaining
to any adverse reactions associated with the drug's use discovered
through "post-marketing studies, reports in scientific literature
and foreign marketing experience." 92 Depending on the severity
of the adverse reactions reported, the FDA may either require the
manufacturer to indicate such reactions on the product's label or
it may mandate the drug's removal from the American market.93
Rockville, Maryland and consists of eight specialized offices with several divisions under
each office. Id.
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988).
See id. § 355(b). All experiments conducted in support of an NDA must be performed
in accordance with FDA's rigid testing requirements. Id.
88 See id. § 355(d) (defining FDA approval process); Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Un-
safe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment K, 42 WAsH. & LEE L. REV.
1139, 1142 (1985) (same). "New" drug is defined as "[a]ny drug the composition of which
is such that such drug is not generally recognized among qualified experts . . . as safe and
effective for use under the condition prescribed . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 321 11(1).
88 21 U.S.C. § 335(d). "Substantial evidence" is defined as:
[C]onsisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investi-
gations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and respon-
sibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the labeling or proposed labelling thereof.
Id.
80 Id.
"1 21 U.S.C. § 355(i); see Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 104 (Utah 1991)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (Halcion neither unique nor essential); cf Selker, supra note 1, at
216 ("The drug [Panalba] had negligible therapeutic value, but, rather, was merely a new
substance created by combining two other antibiotics. [I]t was clearly an instance of a drug
created for a market rather than a medical purpose.").
" Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 97; see Nelson, supra note 41, at 463 (regulations regarding
post marketing procedures).
" See infra note 99 (powers of FDA to recall products).
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III. ThE POLICIES OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION ARE DISTINCT
As contemplated by Comment k, the design of a drug "must be
as safe as the best available testing and research permits," '94 and
the attendant risks of the drug must be unavoidable. 5 Thus, by
the terms of Comment k, a risk would not be "unavoidable" if
there were another drug available with the same benefits and
lesser risks than the drug in question.96 In contrast, the FDA's
New Drug Application makes no inquiry as to the existence of
other comparable drugs having equal or greater utility with fewer
attendant risksY7 Therefore, as defined by Comment k, FDA ap-
proval is not indicative of an "unavoidably unsafe" drug. 8
Moreover, Comment k status is not perpetual. 9 Drugs that at
"( Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 307 (Idaho 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942
(1988).
96 Id.
Id. at 306. Justice Bistline's reasoning in Toner best highlights the difference between
an FDA approved drug and a drug deserving comment k immunity:
As an additional element of an "unavoidable risk," there must be, at the time of the
subject production's distribution, no feasible alternative design which on balance ac-
complishes the subject product's purpose with a lesser risk . . . If there were, than
the risk would not be "unavoidable" or "apparently reasonable."
Id.
d* See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1988) (no requirement that drug be unique).
98 Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 379 (NJ. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 592
A.2d 1176 (1991). It is submitted that this case is particularly illustrative of the FDA's
fallibility. In Feldman, the defendant had contacted the FDA regarding the possibility of
placing a warning on its drugs containing tetracycline concerning that compound's ten-
dency to cause tooth discoloration. Id. The FDA advised the defendant against circulating
such a warning until the FDA had completed its investigation of one of the defendant's
drugs, Declomycin, an antibiotic that contained tetracycline. Id. It was not until over one
year after the FDA received the defendant's request that the FDA approved the warning.
Id. In the interim, plaintiff continued to use Declomycin to control her upper respiratory
infections. Id.; see also Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 929 (Kan. 1990) (doctor
on cross-examination testified that FDA prohibits release of any unsubstantiated comment
or concern regarding drug regardless of reports of adverse incidents).
"' Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 307 (Idaho 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942
(1988). FDA approval is likewise not perpetual. Section 355(e) of Title 21 of the United
States Code, in relevant part, describes the conditions by which a drug may lose its
approval:
The Secretary shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant,
withdraw approval of an application with respect to any drug under this section if
the Secretary finds (1) that clinical or other experience, tests, or other scientific data
show that such drug is unsafe for use under the conditions of use upon the basis of
which the application was approved; (2) that new evidence of clinical experience, not
contained in such application or not available to the Secretary until after such appli-
cation was approved, or tests by new methods, or tests by methods not deemed rea-
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one time qualify for Comment k immunity may lose that status in
subsequent litigation if reports of adverse reactions indicate a
greater risk than benefit, or if a comparable drug with a safer de-
sign is made available."' In contrast, the FDA will not withhold
its approval of a drug merely because potentially safer alternative
drugs exist,1 'O nor will it withdraw approval if such an alternative
becomes available. 0 2 Halcion, approved despite the FDA's own
characterization of the drug as having "no therapeutic advantage
over existing sleeping pills,"' 03 has been permitted to retain FDA
approval notwithstanding the existence of more effective alterna-
tive drugs.'0 4 It is submitted that this illustrates perfectly the need
for a court to independently evaluate each drug's deservedness of
sonably applicable when such application was approved, evaluated together with the
evidence available to the Secretary when the application was approved, shows that
such drug is not shown to be safe for use under the conditions of use upon the basis
of which the application was approved; or (3) on the basis of new information before
him with respect to such drug, evaluated together with the evidence available to him
when the application was approved, that there is a lack of substantial evidence that
the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the condi-
tions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof: or ...
(5) that the at the [sic] application contains any untrue statement of a material fact:
Provided, That if the Secretary ... finds that there is an imminent hazard to the
public health, he may suspend the approval of such application immediately, and
give the applicant prompt notice of his action and afford the applicant the opportu-
nity for an expedited hearing under this subsection ....
Id. Although the means exist for taking a drug off the market, the FDA is not noted for its
swiftness: see, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Young, 770 F.2d 1213, 1215 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1985) ("The pace of proceedings at the Food and Drug Administration [FDA], for
whatever reasons does not rival that of, say, a turn-of-the-century sweatshop in New York
City." (quoting General Medical Co. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 770 F.2d
214, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).
100 Toner, 732 P.2d at 307. In Toner, the court stated:
Where the balancing [of a risk-benefit analysis] results in the application of comment
k's immunity from strict liability, the immunity is not perpetual. If new information
later tips the balance toward the risk of a product, or if new developments make
possible a safer design, at that point further distributions of the product are not
protected by comment k.
Id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 88, at 1147 (public policy not compromised by requiring
manufacturers to keep abreast of developments affecting drug industry).
101 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 104 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(nine other hypnotic agents are available).
1"2 See, e.g., Savina, 795 P.2d at 926-27 (FDA approval of x-ray enhancer dye,
Pantopaque, not withdrawn despite development of safer comparable drug, Amipaque).
The FDA is empowered to withdraw its approval of drugs upon circumstances outlined in
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C. § 335(e) (1984).
103 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 104 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Comment k immunity regardless of FDA approval.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE Grundberg DECISION
In holding that all prescription drugs should receive Comment
k immunity based solely on FDA approval, it is submitted that the
Grundberg court chose convenience over reason. The court elimi-
nated the necessity of litigating on a case-by-case basis, design de-
fect issues and Comment k applicability by holding as a matter of
law, that a drug with FDA approval cannot be defective. 10 5 Such
mechanical adherence to the standards of a government agency
undermines the role of the judicial system to provide plaintiffs
with a form of redress.'0 6 In addition, the court's rationale for
granting Comment k immunity to all prescription drugs ignores
the profit-motivated aspect of the drug industry. 7 In manufac-
turing a drug, the minimizing of costs and marketing in a compet-
101 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 99. "[W]e conclude that a broad grant of immunity from
strict liability claims based on design defects should be extended to FDA-approved pre-
scription drugs in Utah." Id.
10' See Selker, supra note 1, at 203 (goal of strict liability is derived "from an economic
and ethical allocation of responsibility for loss to the source of the defective, injury produc-
ing product" regardless of fault).
10I See Gina Kolata, Records Indicate Company Ignored Warning on Drug, N.Y. TMES, July 4,
1991, at Al. As reported by one journalist:
[Manufacturer F. Hoffmann-La Roche, despite warnings from its Swiss affiliate] went
ahead with what the affiliate correctly predicted would be a dangerously concen-
trated formulation, and more than 40 deaths and about as many injuries resulted.
The drug, known as Versed, was designed to replace injectable Valium as its patent
expired. [Internal] documents, made available to The New York Times by a person
who said he was outraged at the company's conduct, include a memorandum from
the company's own legal advisers stating that it might have disregarded safety con-
cerns for economic reasons.
Id.; see also A.D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability - Design
Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 527 (1976).
The industrial design engineer pays first allegiance to the trilogy of cost, marketabil-
ity and competitive position within the context of product function. Although safety
is a factor in his design plan, it cannot and does not become the focal point of his
endeavors. The engineer does not sit down to design a product with safety at the
head of his list of features or concerns. The products liability case provides that shift
in focus whereby society reexamines the design, taking into account all the factors
that the design engineer must account for, with one difference: in this foruni they
are viewed in light of their ultimate impact on product safety.
Id.: see Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 408 (N.J. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 592
A.2d 1176 (1991). "Granted, drug production is a commercial enterprise but it has a
unique and intimate relationship to the health and even survival of many people." Id.
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itive industry often eclipse safety considerations. 108
The ramifications of Grundberg are clear.10 9 Halcion, a drug
with low utility and potentially high risks, received immunity
under the court's decision. 0 It is submitted that when low-utility
drugs injure individuals-and the drug companies who manufac-
ture the drugs receive immunity-the majority's own public pol-
icy arguments are defeated. The majority sought to provide drug
manufacturers with an incentive to develop new and important
drugs,"1 but in the instant case, a drug which was neither new nor
valuable.. was given immunity. It is submitted the Grundberg de-
cision illustrates that the benefit conferred by granting blanket
immunity inures to the benefit of the drug manufacturers at the
expense of the public health and welfare.
Although the case-by-case approach might seem complicated
and resulting divergent decisions might cause drug companies to
hesitate in marketing certain new drugs, it is nevertheless sug-
gested that this approach better serves public policy by providing
an additional remedy to injured persons in the event the FDA's
testing is flawed."' Furthermore, if a court is to grant Comment k
immunity based solely on FDA determinations, complete defer-
ence should be given to those determinations only in cases involv-
ing experimental new drugs needed for the treatment of deadly
diseases. This would effectuate the clear intent of Comment k and
more adequately serve public policy.""
108 See Selker, supra note 1, at 204 (drug manufacturers do not make drugs merely to
benefit mankind, but to realize a profit); see also Rosenthal, supra note 81, at 18 (Britain
banned Halcion from market). Despite the problems associated with its use, Dr. Theodore
Cooper, Upjohn's Chairman maintains that "[tihere is absolutely no scientific evidence that
warrants withdrawal of Halcion." Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springen, Hard Times for Hal-
cion, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1991, at 61.
108 See generally Sweet Dreams, supra note 81, at 44-46 (discussing details of Grundberg
case).
110 Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 99.
1 Id.
... See supra note 21 (describing Halcion).
' See supra note 48 (recalling of products approved by FDA). It is submitted that the
very existence of FDA recall procedures evidences the fact that FDA approval is not error
free and that serious adverse effects can occur after a product reaches the market, there-
fore under the Court's decision in Grundberg, these injured people would have little re-
course to seek compensation.
114 See Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576 So.2d 728, 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
"We believe that the policy reasons for supporting a blanket approach are countervailed by
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CONCLUSION
The ALI's purpose for including Comment k with Restatement
section 402A was to provide a narrow exception to the harshness
of strict liability for products that cannot be manufactured more
safely. When it was suggested during the drafting of section 402A
that all drugs should be granted Comment k immunity, the ALI
drafters specifically rejected this notion. The Grundberg majority
unjustifiably expanded the literal meaning of Comment k, effec-
tively becoming a judicial rubber stamp of the FDA, relinquishing
its duty to determine liability by checking manufacturers' designs
in accordance with the risk-benefit analysis contemplated by the
authors of Comment k. Instead, the Grundberg court succumbed
to the seduction of convenience and expedience. The majority
failed to show any confidence in the judiciary to analyze complex
issues found in most design defect cases. The decision reached by
the majority is dangerous because it precludes the judicial process
from its traditional obligation to protect society. Individuals in-
jured by this new generation of drugs may have no recourse
against the manufacturers without carrying the burden of proving
negligence. It is submitted that with its decision, the majority ob-
literated the strict products liability doctrine with respect to man-
ufacturers of ethical drugs. Plaintiffs injured by these drugs can
only hope that the Grundberg decision is not followed by their
jurisdiction.
Christopher J. Albee & Dawn Kilgallen
those supporting a more selective application of the comment." Id.; see also West v. G.D.
Searle & Co., Inc., 806 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Ark. 1991) (wording of Comment k calls for case-
by-case analysis).

